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DIAGNOSIS IN GENERAL PRACTICE
Diagnostic strategies used in primary care
The strategies used by general practitioners in making a diagnosis are being formally recognised;
this article is the first in a series that will illustrate their application, and is accompanied by a case
study (doi:10.1136/bmj.b1187)
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Aclinician’sabilitytodiagnoseaccuratelyiscentralinassessing
prognosis and prescribing effective treatments. However, the
strategies clinicians use to arrive at a diagnosis, particularly in
primarycare,makeonlyasmallcontributiontocurrentresearch
and the medical curriculum.
1 Seminal research in the 1970s
showedthatthecommonlytaughtsequentialapproachtohistory
taking and examination, resulting in differential diagnosis and
ultimately a final diagnosis, is not what practitioners do in
reality.
2 3 Researchers observed that diagnostic hypotheses are
madeearlyintheconsultationandguidesubsequenthistoryand
examination, in a process of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.
2
This work sparked debate about our understanding of the
complex strategies used in diagnostic reasoning,
4 5 but most
work has been done away from the clinical setting.
This series of articles aims to set out the strategies and methods
that are used by general practitioners (GPs) in routine clinical
consultations. To check that these strategies were actually used
in practice, we conducted a pilot of diagnostic consultations
from our own practices (box).
Stages in reaching a diagnosis
We found that diagnostic reasoning can be split into a three
stage model: initiation of diagnostic hypotheses; refinement of
the diagnostic hypotheses; and defining the final diagnosis (fig
1)⇓. Different strategies are used in each stage. For example,
the initial complaint, “spot” diagnosis (initial response), or
pattern may trigger the possible diagnoses (hypotheses); then,
specific elements of history or examination are elicited to rule
in or rule out competing possibilities; finally, one or several
strategies may be used to confirm the final diagnosis—for
example, trial of treatment, test of time, or a definitive test.
More than one element may be considered during each stage.
For instance, some rashes can be diagnosed with a visual spot
diagnosis, while for others, spot diagnosis may be part of an
overall pattern recognition strategy with probabilistic
reasoning—for example, a characteristic chicken pox rash in a
child with a fever. In addition, for some diagnoses a high level
of certainty at the initiation stage may lead straight to a final
knowndiagnosis,missingouttherefinementstep—forexample,
diagnosing simple acne.
Strategies in the initiation stage
The first trigger for a diagnosis usually occurs early in the
consultation.
3 We identified four possible strategies: spot
diagnosis, self labelling, the presenting complaint, and pattern
recognition trigger (fig 2)⇓.
“Spot” diagnosis arises from an unconscious recognition of a
particular non-verbal pattern, usually visual (dermatological
condition such as acne) or auditory (a barking cough). The spot
diagnosisisalmostinstantaneous,reliesonpreviousnon-verbal
experienceofthecondition,anddoesnotrequirefurtherhistory
fromthepatienttotriggerthepossiblediagnosis.Manyconsider
a spot diagnoses as basically pattern recognition, and Sackett
et al referred to spot diagnosis as the “Auntie Minnie”
phenomenon:instantrecognitionofarelative,sothatastranger
is not greeted by a hearty slap on the back.
7 It seems that the
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PRACTICEIdentifying and refining diagnostic strategies used in general practice
We conducted two sessions of group discussion and a prospective evaluation of these strategies during primary care consultations.
In the pilot phase, a focus group composed of GPs and researchers in primary health care identified several possible diagnostic strategies,
based on consensus opinion and the published literature. Use of these strategies was assessed in a consecutive series of 100 patients
presenting with a new condition to one GP (CH). Strategies were recorded on a spreadsheet at the end of each consultation. The group of
GPs then discussed these pilot results, and revised and refined the set of strategies.
We revised the data collection sheet and asked six GPs to record their diagnostic strategies for 50 new patients at the end of each consultation.
The GPs were two partners (27 and 16 years’ clinical experience), two registrars (8 and 4 years’ experience), one part time assistant (29
years’ experience), and one locum (7 years’ experience). At a final focus session, the six GPs and one statistician reviewed data from these
300 consultations, using a consensus development approach,
6 and clarified definitions used for the diagnostic strategies.
main determinant in the use of spot diagnosis is clinical
experience with a given condition.
8 9 Examples in our series
included eczema, moles, acne, molluscum, and infective
conjunctivitis. Spot diagnosis was used in about 20% of cases,
and for 63% of these, no further diagnostic strategy was used.
Self labelling—The patient may tell you what they perceive to
be the diagnosis. This may or may not be correct, and is often
based on their own or an acquaintance’s previous experience
of a problem, but it immediately directs subsequent refinement
of the diagnosis. An example in our series was “I have
tonsillitis.” In some conditions, but not all, self labelling can be
accurate:astudyofwomenwithrecurrenturinarytractinfection
showedthat84%ofnewinfections(confirmedbyculture)were
correctly self diagnosed.
10 In our prospective evaluation, cases
such as gout and chest infection were mislabelled by patients.
Presenting complaint (for instance, “I have abdominal pain” or
“I have a headache”) was used most often by our GPs (fig 2⇓),
and traditional textbooks and teaching recognise this step at the
outset of the consultation.
Pattern recognition trigger—Elements in the history or
examination, or both (sometimes related to the presenting
complaint) may trigger the hypothesis. For example, thirst,
feelingunwell,andlookingunwellinanadolescenttriggersthe
possibility of type 1 diabetes.
Strategies in the refinement stage
Once the initial possible diagnoses are formed, other strategies
are used to narrow the possibilities. These strategies are not
mutually exclusive. We found that five strategies were used in
the refinement stage: restricted rule out process, stepwise
refinement, probabilistic reasoning, pattern fit, and clinical
prediction rule (fig 3)⇓.
Restricted rule outs—also called Murtagh’s process.
11 This
diagnosticstrategydependsonlearningthemostcommoncause
of the presenting problem (the “probability diagnosis”) and a
shortlist of serious diagnoses which must be ruled out. For
instance, in headache the common causes are tension-type
headache and migraine, but malignant hypertension, temporal
arteritis,andsubarachnoidhaemorrhagemustroutinelyberuled
out, even if these diagnoses have not been triggered by the
presentation. This strategy is aimed at preventing errors in
clinical practice.
12
Stepwise refinement is based on either the anatomical location
of the problem or the putative underlying pathological process.
Arm pain might be further refined to the wrist and then to the
radialsideofthewrist,forexampleindiagnosingdeQuervain’s
tenosynovitis. An example of refinement based on the
underlyingdiseaseisdecidingwhetherconjunctivitisisallergic
or infectious.
Probabilistic reasoning is the specific but probably imperfect
use of symptoms, signs, or diagnostic tests to rule in or rule out
adiagnosis.Probabilisticreasoningrequiresknowingthedegree
to which a positive or negative result of a test adjusts the
probability of a given disease.
13 Examples include the
examination of the temporal artery in the diagnosis of temporal
arteritis, use of urinary dipstick in urinary tract infections, and
use of electrocardiograms in the assessment of chest pain.
Pattern recognition fit—symptoms and signs are compared to
previouspatternsorcases,andadiseaseisrecognisedwhenthe
actual pattern fits. This is the refinement strategy most
commonly used by GPs (fig 2⇓). Its use relies on memory of
known patterns, but no specific rule is used. Some conditions
may have various patterns—for example, acute myocardial
infarction.
Clinicalpredictionruleisaformalversionofpatternrecognition
based on a well defined and widely validated series of similar
cases.TheGPsusedtheOttawaanklerules,
14streptococcalsore
throat rules,
15 ABCD score for stroke risk,
16 HAD score for
depression,
17 Wells rule for deep vein thrombosis,
18 and chest
infection rules.
19 20 Which rules are useful and how they can
best be used in practice remains an important unanswered
question.
Strategies in the final definition stage
Less than 50% of cases resulted in the certainty of a “known
diagnosis”withoutfurthertesting.ThusGPsuseotherstrategies
in the final stage of diagnosis, including ordering further tests,
test of treatment, and test of time. In some cases the final
diagnosis could not be given a label (fig 4)⇓.
Knowndiagnosis—asufficientlevelofcertaintyofthediagnosis
to start appropriate treatment or to rule out serious disease
without further testing—for example, viral upper respiratory
infection, acne, or a wart. The level of certainty required by a
GPmaydifferfromthatinahospitalconsultation.Forexample,
a GP’s job is to suspect an acute coronary event, and start
appropriate treatment and referral, whereas in hospital the
diagnosis relies on the precise classification of acute coronary
syndrome for appropriate management.
21 Sometimes it is not
practical to diagnose a specific microbiological or pathological
cause. For example, conjunctivitis requires culture and
polymerasechainreactiontoidentifytheinfectiveagentin80%
of children; however, this does not affect clinical management,
and GPs are adept at identifying acute infective conjunctivitis,
differentiating it from other causes of red eye, and initiating
appropriate management.
22
Ordering further tests—a standard test can sometimes be used
toruleinorruleoutthedisease—forexample,midstreamurine
(MSU) in urinary tract infection. In addition, further tests were
used in response to “red flags” and when the diagnoses did not
fit any obvious pattern of disease.
Testoftreatment—whenthediagnosisisuncertain,theresponse
to treatment is often used to refute or confirm it. Examples
included the use of inhalers in nocturnal cough.
Test of time—the course of the disease is used to predict when
a person should be better or worse; a “wait and see” strategy
allows the diagnosis to become more obvious. For example, in
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PRACTICEa patient with abdominal pain, diarrhoea, and no red flags, and
whoisdiagnosedashavingviralgastroenteritis,mostGPswould
wait one or two weeks before considering other disease or
testing.
No label applied—where no diagnostic label could be assigned
to the patient, presentations were often vague and didn’t fit a
recognisable pattern. Various strategies can be used: recalling
thepatientforfurtherreview,usinganexploratoryinvestigation,
sharing uncertainty with the patient, or referral to secondary
care for a second opinion.
Positive red flag
Red flags are specific symptoms or signs that may be
volunteered by the patient (central crushing chest pain, for
example)ormayneedtobeelicitedinthehistoryorexamination
to rule out a serious condition (for example, checking for neck
stiffness in a patient with headache to rule out meningitis). If
thesymptomorsigncannotberuledout,ittriggersaction,which
canrangefromamoredetailedphysicalexaminationtohospital
referral.
Discussion
We have illustrated the strategies that a sample of GPs used in
their clinical consultations. GPs agreed on the stages and the
strategies used, but how they used them differed. For instance,
one GP used clinical prediction rules for common cases such
aschestinfection
19 20andsorethroat
15;othersusedtheminrarer,
moreseriousconditionsseeninprimarycare,suchasdeepvein
thrombosis.
18
Murtagh’s restricted rule out process proved the most
controversial of the definitions. Some GPs used a cognitive
forcing strategy, whereby plausible alternative diagnoses were
not considered once a diagnosis had been reached (a common
cause of diagnostic error).
23 Others were unaware of or avoided
this strategy.
Few GPs formally recognised their use of probabilistic
reasoning. This is in line with previous studies which indicate
most practising physicians do not use formal recommended
quantitativemethods.
24Forthefinaldiagnosis,testsoftreatment
and time were used on average for a quarter of consultations,
despitetherebeingapoorevidencebaseinformingthisprocess.
The data we present have limitations: we cannot tell whether
the difference in the use of strategies results from the case mix
or the doctors. Both probably are a factor, with cases varying
more than the individual GP’s use of a given strategy. In
addition, selective bias in the reporting of strategies may result
fromusingthecollectionsheetsandrecall.Duringconsultations
the GPs tended to record the main problem only, leading to a
selective under-reporting of secondary problems.
25 Thus the
doctors in our study may have under-reported using a second
or third strategy.
None of the diagnostic strategies discussed here is new. What
is new is the formal recognition of these strategies in the stages
of making a diagnosis and how commonly they are used in
primarycare.Expertiseindiagnosisisnotamatterofacquiring
an all-inclusive reasoning strategy, as several strategies may
lead to the same diagnosis. The recognition of the strategies in
all medical practice should encourage the use of experience to
guide our search for the correct diagnosis.
26 Throughout this
series we will illustrate the principles presented here with a
number of clinical presentations, expanding on the reasoning
and the justification for these diagnostic strategies.
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PRACTICEFigures
Fig 1 Stages and strategies in arriving at a diagnosis
Fig 2 Strategies used by general practitioners in making an initial diagnosis. Bars indicate means
Fig 3 Strategies used by general practitioners in refining a diagnosis. Bars indicate means
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PRACTICEFig 4 Strategies used by general practitioners in defining the diagnosis. Bars indicate means
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